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IntRoDUCtIon
The papers collected in this number of Phenomenology and mind aim at 
analyzing max scheler’s work and understanding to what extent his 
reflection can be useful to current debates – in particular as far as values, 
emotions, and norms are concerned. 
max ferdinand scheler (munich, 1874 - frankfurt, 1928) was one of the most 
prolific German intellectuals of his time and a pioneer in phenomenology. 
The first encounter with phenomenology happened in 1902, when Scheler met 
Edmund Husserl. In Munich, where he came back in 1906 after he completed 
his studies in Berlin and Jena, he established, together with Theodor lipps, 
the circle of the “munich Phenomenologists”. some of the members of this 
group were: maximillian Beck, Theodor conrad, moritz geiger, dietrich von 
hildebrand, herbert leyendecker, hedwig martius, and alexander Pfänder.
his thinking touches on a huge variety of areas both within philosophy and 
in other related fields and it gives rise to a variety of questions that have 
been and are still central in different domains. 
as the stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy, rightly notices:
a pioneer in the development of phenomenology in the early part of the 
20th century, scheler broke new ground in many areas of philosophy 
and established himself as perhaps the most creative of the early 
phenomenologists. relative to the attention his work received and the 
attention his contemporaries now enjoy, interest in scheler’s work and 
thought waned considerably. This decrease in attention is in part due to the 
suppression of Scheler’s work by the Nazis from 1933–1945, a suppression 
stemming from his Jewish heritage and outspoken denunciation of fascism 
and national socialism. nevertheless, his work has survived and continues 
to be read and translated throughout the world, serving as evidence of the 
creative depth and richness of his thought (Davis, and Steinbock 2013).
in deciding which domains within his extensive work we wanted to focus on, 
we were enlightened by Zahavi’s reflections (Zahavi 2010).
scheler’s strength as a phenomenological thinker is undoubtedly to be 
found in his concrete analyses – in particular in his analyses of emotional 
life and sociality (Zahavi 2010, p. 175).
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Taking seriously this insight, we focused on three particular aspects of his 
thought. we never thought of them as being exhaustive as far as scheler’s 
work is concerned, but we thought they might be particularly interesting 
both because of scheler’s contribution per se and because of his possible 
relevance in contemporary debates. 
The three domains we wanted to focus on are: emotions, values, and norms. 
according to this distinction, we invited our contributors to focus on one of 
these domains. 
But, before entering into the details about the sections of this number, 
we would like to spend a few words about the great opportunity we had 
to reprint part of the third chapter of wolfgang Köhler’s an analysis of 
requiredness, who also provided the idea for the title of the present number 
of Phenomenology and mind. 
The permission was granted by w. w. norton, that holds the copyright to the 
title (copyright: 1938, liveright Publishing corporation). we would like to 
thank in particular emma f. Berry and elisabeth Kerr for their kindness and 
helpfulness. 
The selection, which is particularly relevant for the topic of the present 
issue, is introduced by roberta de monticelli’s words. 
As we have mentioned, the first Section of the present number of 
Phenomenology and mind concerns emotions. our interest was on the essential 
properties of emotions and on their role in our interaction with others in a 
social context. 
Our first invited contribution is by Andrea Zhok (University of Milan). In 
his On Scheler’s metaphysics of love: an appraisal andrea Zhok recollects some 
of scheler’s main arguments concerning the status of “affective life” and 
tries a sympathetic appraisal of the bearing of these theses. after resuming 
scheler’s assessment of love and showing its conceptual connections with 
intentionality, spiritual values and sensuous corporeality, andrea Zhok 
sketches an account of the ontological and axiological role of love. love 
turns out to be interpretable as a pervasive drive that shapes both natural 
and cultural history, while history, in its most comprehensive sense, is 
not viewed either as sheer contingency or as teleology, but rather as an 
exploratory cosmological venture.
The aim of our second invited paper by francesca forlè (Vita-salute san 
raffaele university, milan) and daniela Perani (Vita-salute san raffaele 
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university, nuclear medicine department and division of neuroscience san 
Raffaele Scientific Institute, Milan) in their emotions in music. an Overview of 
musical expressive Qualities is two-fold. on the one hand, the authors describe 
the emotional and affective power of music by means of the analysis of 
music expressive qualities - tertiary qualities or value-qualities  that emerge from 
the structure of the musical objects. on the other, they focus on rhythm 
as one of the “core contributors” for music expressiveness, giving also a 
phenomenological account of rhythmic perception.
roberta guccinelli (member of the max scheler gesellschaft, italian translator 
of scheler’s formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of Values: a new attempt 
Toward the foundation of an ethical Personalism), in her When the facts “Call down 
Vengeance”. feeling of revenge, Sensibility to injustice and (a hint at) retributive 
Justice in Scheler’s Formalism, aims at providing an elucidation of what, at first 
sight, appears as a specific and negative affective phenomenon, namely that 
of revenge, which, although its sinister popularity, constantly risks to be 
muddled with a simple state of excitement deprived of intentionality or with 
a kind of “justice without justice”. The understanding of the nature of revenge 
and of impulse of revenge allows to enlighten a peculiar feeling’s class, to 
which revenge in a certain sense belongs to, and to investigate the meaning 
and the sense of scheler’s ambiguous term “Vergeltung”, in order to attribute 
to retributive model of justice, by a comparison with revenge, its correct role 
and place in the world of scheler’s. The author’s back-idea is the one according 
to which refining sensibility to injustices can contribute to a primary form of 
identity, namely that of our living body.   
The first of our contributor’s papers for this first Section, by luigina mortani 
(university of Verona) and federica Valbusa (university of Verona), focuses 
on a particular role that emotions can play. in their affective responses 
and Personal flourishing, they analyze the connection between personal 
flourishing and affective states. In particular, the paper reconstructs, 
develops and discusses scheler’s Bildung theory to highlight its relevance for 
educational philosophy. The authors point out that a personality flourishes 
through a process of progressive individuation which is modulated by 
affective maturation and promoted by the encounter with an exemplarity. 
finally, anna Piazza (universität erfurt, maX-weBer-Kolleg für Kultur- 
und sozialwissenschaftliche studien), in her Scheler’s foundation of ethics, 
deals with scheler’s emotional ethics and its relationship with a possible 
ontological foundation. The author addresses the theme of values and acts, 
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asking whether they are rooted in being or whether they possess their 
status autonomously, and where they obtain their legality and consistency 
from.
This last contribution introduces the theme of values – as it is connected 
with that of emotions. leading us to the theme of our second Section.
in the second Section, as we have mentioned, our interest was that of 
understanding what are values in Scheler’s work and how his reflections 
can improve contemporary debates about them. we also wanted our 
contributors to elaborate on the existence of an order of values, on 
its possible objectivity, and on the role of this order of values for the 
constitution of a personal ethos. finally, we were particularly interested in 
understanding what can be drawn from scheler’s works on the relationship 
between “values” and “facts”, and whether his Value Theory can be conceived 
of as a reformulation of the is-ought question. 
roberta de monticelli (Vita-salute san raffaele university, milan), in her 
requiredness. an argument for value-realism, addresses the problem of the 
ontological status of values. our invited author defends several arguments 
in favour of Axiological Realism, a specific version of the thesis about the 
objectivity of values. roberta de monticelli’s aim is that of answering the 
question posed by Wolfgang Köhler in the book from which we extracted 
the paragraphs published in this volume, so that this paper provides also a 
theoretical reflection stemming from those pages. So, what is An analysis 
of Requiredness? The arguments proposed are based on a principle of non-
reducibility of integral wholes to sums, as informally developed by gestalt 
theorists, systematically worked out by husserl in his iii logical investigation 
on wholes and parts, and exploited by max scheler’s theory of material and 
axiological a priori.
The second invited paper of this Section is by Veniero Venier (udine 
university). in governing emotions. husserl and Personal Vocation, the author deals 
with Husserl central question about the creation of a personal order, related 
to values and their cognition. an order in which the fundamental structure of 
the actual idea of a person is revealed: that of being the essential tie between 
feeling, motivation of volition and logical-argumentative coherence. This 
value is felt emotionally but the true understanding of the value only occurs 
in rational choice, when feeling is concretely translated into value. 
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Our first contributor in this Section is Virginia sanchini (folsaTec, 
department of experimental oncology, european institute of oncology 
(ieo), italy; department of health sciences, university of milan, italy; 
european school of molecular medicine (semm)) with her paper: not Kant vs. 
Scheler, but either Kant or Scheler. from Construction to foundation of ethics. in the 
author’s view, scheler’s moral theory is often presented as a critical reaction 
to Kantian formalism. The majority of contributions on this topic deals 
with scheler’s proposal of an a priori material ethics in contrast with the a 
priori formal ethics developed by Kant, or with the critical analysis of the 
eight prejudices ascribed by scheler to Kant. a very few of them, however, 
explore their respective foundational attempts to see why such a conflict 
actually arises. The paper addresses the foundational issue. it will be shown 
that the disagreement between the two authors should not be ascribed to 
a real incompatibility, but rather to a different way of conceiving what the 
foundation of ethics actually is. 
James edward hackett (university of akron, akron, ohio), in his The Case for 
Participatory realism in Scheler’s ethics, believes, following Phil Blosser, that 
the major defect of scheler’s philosophy of values lies in the fact of not being 
clear about values’ ontological status. 
in his paper, the author argues that being-an-act (akt-sein) provides us with 
insight into scheler’s value ontology. The thesis rests on two fundamental 
premises: showing how scheler’s phenomenology opens up into ontology, 
and how being-an-act is understood with that opening in mind in scheler’s 
idealism and realism essay. 
susi ferrarello (loyola university, chicago; saybrook university, san 
francisco) has three goals in her Values, normativity and facts: firstly, to 
describe the relation between values, norms, and facts; secondly, to consider 
whether norms are a constituent part of the essence of values; and, finally, 
to define the boundaries of axiology. To reach these goals the author 
presents an historical-phenomenological reconstruction of the relationship 
between values, norms and facts. 
As it has happened for the last contribution of the first Section, this last 
contribution is somehow a bridge from the second to the third Section of our 
volume, as it introduces and debates the connection between values and norms.  
The third and last Section concerns norms, their essential properties in scheler’s 
account, the role they play in relation to scheler’s Value Theory, and the 
potential relevance of Scheler’s reflections for contemporary debate about them.
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in Norms without Values. Philosophical Reflections on Carl Schmitt’s Tyranny 
of Values, Paola Premoli de marchi (adjunct Professor of ethics, fisPPa, 
university of Padua), by reference to carl schmitt’s The Tyranny of Values 
(1954), asks whether norms can be justified without reference to values. The 
paper focuses on the premises of schmitt’s perspective and aims to show 
that the rejection of values as foundation of civil laws depends upon some 
philosophical assumptions, even though Schmitt defined himself a jurist 
and not a philosopher. The first part of the paper is dedicated to explain 
the historical background of schmitt’s notion of value. The second part 
introduces the content of Tyranny of Values concerning the relation between 
norms and values. afterwards, the author explains the main thesis defended 
by schmitt, namely the relationship between the posing of values and 
aggressiveness, and investigates its theoretical premises. The fourth part 
addresses the question of how norms can be justified without values, in 
Schmitt’s view. And, finally, the author aims to reply to Schmitt’s rejection 
of values by drawing on some insights by scheler, who is the main exponent 
of the value theory attacked in the Tyranny of Values.
again on the relation between norms and values, davide fassio (university of 
Geneva) focuses on the distinction between the two concepts. It is difficult to 
find decisive criteria by which to distinguish norms from values. In his how 
to distinguish norms from Values, the author focuses on analyzing the essential 
properties of norms, that are not ascribable to values themselves. The relevant 
properties, possessed by the former but not by the latter, are that norms 
are directed to some addressees, possess conditions of satisfaction and are 
supposed to guide and motivate their addressees to satisfy these conditions. 
To come to such a conclusion, davide fassio focuses on different traditional 
ways of distinguishing between the two and on the traditional criteria of 
such a differentiation. The aim of the paper is not that of arguing against the 
existence of a relation between the two domain, but rather that of finding the 
criteria for a conceptual distinction based on the properties that each one has 
or has not. 
olimpia giuliana loddo (university of cagliari), in her contribution rules 
of distribution and the Concept of “egalitarianism” in felix Oppenheim. Towards 
understanding distribution, reconstructs felix oppenheim’s description of 
“egalitarianism” on the basis of rules of distribution. afterwards, the author 
reverses oppenheim’s perspective by analyzing the role of distributives 
rules and of “egalitarianism” towards understanding distribution. in 
what measure does the concept of “egalitarianism” help us to understand 
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distribution? Is it possible to understand a distribution only on the basis 
of descriptive concepts? As Olimpia Giuliana Loddo points out, in order 
to choose consciously between two or more rules of distribution we need 
to adopt a value judgement on the content of that rule. so that, in the 
author’s view, values can represent a peculiar point of view that allows us to 
perceive, on the one hand, selected aspects of rules of distribution and, on 
the other hand, the peculiar ethical meaning of the (rule-governed) practice 
of distribution. even considering very practical issues such as egalitarianism 
and distribution, values play a distinctive role and scheler’s work proves 
itself to be extremely useful for contemporary and everyday life issues in 
political and social context.  
essien d. essien (department of religious and cultural studies, university 
of uyo, akwa ibom state, nigeria) examines, in his The hidden dimension of 
Social norms in ibibio: Tri-Tangential Trajectory of ibibio indigenuos Knowledge 
on morality, a very specific set of norm. In particular, the author focuses 
on the hidden ethical elements of norms in ibibio culture and its day-
to-day manifestations within the periscope of ethical prerequisite. The 
paper presents a socio-cultural description of ibibio norms which are an 
integral part of the culture, social custom, rituals and beliefs governing 
social coexistence. it argues that, though norms are a cultural production 
with emphasis on prohibitions, ibibio norms dictate behavioral and/or 
conversational re-orientation. 
The last content of this volume are two book reviews of the new italian 
translation of max scheler der formalismus in der ethik und die materiale 
Wertethik. neuer Versuch der grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus, 
published by Bompiani and edited by Roberta Guccinelli (2013). 
we wanted to give some space to this new and extremely relevant 
translation by roberta guccinelli (member of the max scheler gesellschaft, 
italian translator of scheler’s formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of 
Values: a new attempt Toward the foundation of an ethical Personalism) and we 
did so by asking Barbara malvestiti (university of milan) and Jonathan Bazzi 
(Vita-salute san raffaele university) to review the new translation. 
we hope these contents can provide some insight on formalism, to guide 
its reading, and provide some interpretative tools for those who want to 
approach such a deep work by max ferdinand scheler. 
in the end, as invited editors, we would like to thank all the contributors, 
those who were invited by us and those who answered our call for papers, 
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both for their interesting contributions and for their responsiveness and 
kindness. we also wanted to thank the reviewers for their comments on the 
papers and their helpfulness. 
finally, our gratitude goes to the editorial Board – Francesca Boccuni, Stefano 
Cardini, Roberta De Monticelli, Francesca De Vecchi, Serena Rizzello – for 
all the support and advice they gave us throughout the production of this 
volume. we would like to thank also iuss Press, our publishing house, in the 
person of roberta lucentini.
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